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STUDENT WORKS
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
IN WILSON V. FRIEDBERG
I. INTRODUCTION
Modem corporate law recognizes that a corporation is a legal entity
whose debts and obligations are separate and distinct from those of its
shareholders.' This separation, however, is not absolute, and a court may
"disregard the entity when its separateness is used for illegitimate purposes. "
2
Disregarding the corporate entity, or "piercing the corporate veil," is the
judicially imposed exception to limited liability status. Judicial exercise of this
doctrine strips the shareholder of limited liability and makes him responsible
for corporate actions as if they were his own.3 Traditionally, South Carolina
courts have not pierced a corporate veil without substantial reflection and
mature consideration. 4  However, in a recent case captioned as Wilson v.
Friedberg,5 the South Carolina Court of Appeals upheld a decision to pierce
1. See 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 2 (1990); 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1 (1985). South
Carolina codifies this separationby providing statutory limited liability for corporate shareholders.
Unless the corporation's articles of incorporation specify that the corporation elects to opt out of
this protection, shareholders cannot be held personally liable for corporate obligations absent
voluntary assumption of liability through personal conduct. The statute provides in pertinent
part:
Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a
corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that
he may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-6-220(b) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
2. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L.
REv. 1036, 1041 (1991).
3. Id. at 1036. The South Carolina Supreme Court recognized in Parker Peanut Co. v.
Felder, 200 S.C. 203, 215, 20 S.E.2d 716, 720 (1942) that the corporate entity may be
disregarded in "the proper case." The general rule is that the corporation will be held to be a
legal entity until there is sufficient justification for applying the piercing doctrine. Sturkie v.
Sifly, 280 S.C. 453, 457, 313 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ct. App. 1984) ("W]hen the notion of legal
entity is used to protect fraud, justify wrong, or defeat public policy, the law will regard the
corporation as an association of persons."). Though fraud is often one of the justifications for
disregarding the corporate entity, it is not the only factor taken into consideration. DeWitt Truck
Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 684 (4th Cir. 1976).
4. Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 457, 313 S.E.2d at 318; Baker v. Equitable Leasing Corp., 275 S.C.
359, 367, 271 S.E.2d 596, 600 (1980).
5. __ S.C. __, 473 S.E.2d 854 (Ct. App. 1996)
1
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the veil of a corporate general partner (placing personal liability on the sole
shareholder) despite a complete lack of substantiating evidence.6
II. BACKGROUND
The dispute in Wilson concerned investments in two limited partnerships.
Four individuals, who later became the plaintiffs in the action, were the
limited partners. A corporation, Royal Promotions, Inc., was the general
partner. Richard H. Friedberg owned all of the stock of Royal Promotions.
After both limited partnerships sustained losses in the ventures undertaken, 7
the limited partners requested income and expense records for both partner-
ships. Subsequently, when Royal Promotions failed to produce the requested
documentation, the limited partners sued, alleging that Royal Promotions hadmismanaged the partnerships, diverted partnership funds to other interests of
the corporation and its shareholder, and failed to accurately account for
production expenses. At trial, the master disregarded Royal Promotions as a
corporate entity and ordered Friedberg to return a portion of the limited
partners' capital contributions.'
Royal Promotions was held to be Friedberg's alter ego, a mere instrumen-
tality for limiting the liability of his personal ventures. 9 Though the Court of
6. Id.
7. Wilson, __S.C. at __, 473 S.E.2d at 855. The first arrangement required each limited
partner to contribute $5,000.00 to the "Shag Musical Review L.P.," an original music review
held in Charleston. After the production of the Shag Review, Royal Promotions reported to its
investors that there was a net loss of $20,067.75, even after application of their $20,000.00
capital contribution. Each limited partner also invested $4,000.00 in a second production, "Fight
Night Charleston No. 6 L.P.." After Fight Night, Royal Promotions reported a total loss of
$12,164.00, again after offsetting the production costs against receipts and the $16,000.00 in
initial capital. Id.
8. The master concluded that the actual total losses for Shag Review and Fight Night were
$18,874.28 and $14,512.64 respectively. The master determined that the losses should be borne
by the limited partners and the general partner in the same proportions as profits would have been
shared. The limited partners therefore shared in $4,837.57 of the loss from Fight Night, entitling
them to return of their capital contribution in the amount of $11,162.45. Likewise, they shared
in $6,291.43 of the Shag Review loss, entitling them to a return of $13,708.57. Id. at 855-56.
9. Id. at 856. The respondents had veil-piercing as a means of recourse because of the
manner in which the investors structured the limited partnerships. Though the general partner
is normally personally liable in a limited partnership, it has become standard practice for a limited
partnership to use a corporation as its general partner so as to limit this personal liability. See
Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing the Corporate Identity
Question, 95 MICH. L. REv. 393, 410 (1996).
South Carolina, by adopting the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, sanctions the
use of this type of partnership by including corporations within its definition of "persons" who
may qualify as general partners. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-42-20(11) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
This structure provides limited liability for all parties while maintaining the preferred tax
consequences allowed to partnerships.
[Vol. 48:905
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Appeals reversed the master's allocation of losses, it upheld the disregard of
the corporate entity and affirmed Friedberg's personal liability.
The majority opinion in Wilson applied the two-pronged test for veil-
piercing set forth in Sturkie v. Sifly.'° The first prong of the test requires the
court to examine eight factors that analyze the shareholder's relationship to the
corporation. The principal aim is to determine whether or not the shareholder
properly respects the separate identities of corporation and shareholder.11
The Sturkie court essentially adopted eight factors set forth in DeWitt Truck
Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co. 2 to fashion this first prong inquiry:
(1) whether the corporation was grossly undercapitalized considering the
particular corporation's purpose or undertaking;
(2) failure to observe corporate formalities;
(3) non-payment of dividends;
(4) the insolvency of the debtor corporation at the time;
(5) siphoning of funds of the corporation by the dominant stockholder;
(6) non-functioning of other officers or directors;
(7) absence of corporate records;
and
(8) the fact that the corporation was merely a facade for the operations of
the dominant stockholder or stockholders.'
3
The second prong from Sturkie questions whether continued recognition of the
corporate entity will result in injustice or fundamental unfairness. 4 This
10. 280 S.C. 453, 313 S.E.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1984). In Sturkie, the respondents were sole
stockholders and officers of an incorporated furniture company. The corporation was
undercapitalized, failed to adhere to corporate formalities, and carried a loss of $265,181.00 on
its Profit and Loss Statement. Adding to the company's woes, an employee obtained a default
judgment against the corporation for back wages and commissions. When faced with the
arguments of a receiver attempting to satisfy the employee's judgment, the South Carolina Court
of Appeals held that piercing was not justified because the receiver had failed to substantiate a
claim of fundamental unfairness or injustice. Id. at 455-56, 313 S.E.2d at 317.
11. See Cumberland Wood Prods. v. Bennett, 308 S.C. 268, 271,417 S.E.2d 617, 619 (Ct.
App. 1992).
12. 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976).
13. Id. at 685-87. To satisfy the first prong of the piercing test, the corporation must
demonstrate a number of the above factors. Dumas v. Infosafe Corp., 320 S.C. 188, 192, 463
S.E.2d 641, 644 (Ct. App. 1995).
14. Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 457-58,313 S.E.2d at 319. The second prong of the test comes not
only from DeWitt but also from FDIC v. Sea Pines, 692 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 928 (1983). In Sea Pines, the defendant parent corporation mortgaged its subsidiary's
only unencumbered asset so as to receive a $250,000.00 loan from the plaintiffbank. Though
the subsidiary was already grossly undercapitalized, the directors of the parent corporation used
the loan to pay the debts of the parent corporation and credited only $8,000.00 of the loan
proceeds to the subsidiary. In addition to the justification for piercing supplied by the
corporation's undercapitalized status, the subsidiary shared a common board of directors with its
3
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prong places the burden on the plaintiff to prove "(1) that the defendant was
aware of the plaintiff's claim against the corporation, and (2) thereafter, the
defendant acted in a self-serving manner with regard to the property of the
corporation and in disregard of the plaintiff's claim in the property."" 5
Finally, South Carolina courts will only apply the two pronged veil-piercing
test when equity requires protection of a third-party, 6 and because a claim
to pierce is an equitable action, a reviewing court will be allowed to forge its
own view of the facts in issue.'
7
I. ANALYSIS
A. Wilson's Scant Application of the Two-prong Test
In Wilson, the court of appeals focused first on Royal Promotions' role
as general partner in the limited partnerships. Royal Promotions did not have
any permanent employees and hired only temporary employees for its various
promotions. Friedberg owned all of Royal Promotions' stock and prepared the
financial reports for the two limited partnerships. Many of Royal Promotions'
events were held at the King Street Palace in Charleston, which was owned by
Carolina Film South Corporation. Friedberg and his wife also owned 85
percent of the Carolina Film South's stock. Friedberg kept inadequate records
of expenses, handled most of the Royal Promotions' transactions in cash,
commingled funds from various other ventures, and failed to file tax returns
for Royal Promotions in its two years of its existence. Very simply, the
Wilson court relied on the foregoing facts to determine that the plaintiffs met
parent. Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit held that the actions of the parent and the subsidiary were
fundamentally unfair to the bank and indeed pierced the corporate veil. Id. at 973-75.
15. Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 459, 313 S.E.2d at 319. From these criteria, it appears that the
plaintiff may only rely on corporate activities occurring after a claim accrues. Thus, this aspect
of the fundamental unfairness test imposes a knowledge or intent requirement on the corporation
at fault. From a policy standpoint, this standard creates a risk that the public will be without
recourse in the event that an unsound corporation ceases its activity after a claim arises. See
WilliamH. Nicholson III, Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil: "Fundamental Unfairness "Defined,
37 S.C. L. REv. 23, 26-27 (1985).
16. Woodside v. Woodside, 290 S.C. 366, 370, 350 S.E.2d 407, 410 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing
Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 453, 313 S.E.2d at 316).
17. Townes Assocs. Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 86221 S.E.2d 773,775 (1976);
see also Dumas, 320 S.C. at 192, 463 S.E.2d at 643. Although the reviewing court definitively
has this flexibility in an equitable action, the court in DeWitt pointed out that the veil piercing
question is fundamentally an issue of fact; hence, its resolution is primarily the trial court's
domain. A trial court's piercing decision will be deemed "presumptively correct" and "left
undisturbed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous." DeWitt, 540 F.2d at 684.
[Vol. 48:905
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their burden of proof regarding the shareholder's relationship to the corpora-
tion and his failure to observe corporate formalities. 18
As for the fundamental unfairness analysis, the court stated only that the
evidence was sufficient to support the master's conclusion at the trial level.
The court offered no analysis of its own, simply quoting the ruling of the
master:
This case is based on the fiduciary duty of the general partner to the
limited partners. I find that Friedberg and Royal Promotions were one and
the same for the operation of Fight Night [and Shag Musical Review] and
there would be fundamental unfairness if the acts of the corporation not be
regarded as the acts of Friedberg. 19
In summary, the majority in Wilson failed to specify, with any degree of
particularity, evidence that justified piercing Royal Promotions' corporate veil.
In particular, the court failed to articulate which, if any, of the DeWitt factors
applied to Royal Promotions and Mr. Friedberg. Instead, the Court found it
sufficient to view "the record as a whole"" and uphold the lower court's
decision to pierce.
B. Viewing the Record as a Whole
In fact, the record, viewed as a whole, does not clearly indicate that the
plaintiffs sustained their burden of proof2" for the first prong of the Sturkie
analysis. This is the primary criticism of Judge Anderson's dissenting
opinion.22 The record does not indicate that the plaintiffs made any allega-
tions of gross undercapitalization, non-payment of dividends, corporate
insolvency or failure to observe corporate formalities.23 Though the plaintiffs
18. Wilson, _ S.C., 473 S.E.2d at 856.
19. Id. at 856-57. South Carolina has codified this general partner's fiduciary duty:
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit and hold as trustee
for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any
transaction connected with the formation, conduct or liquidation of the partnership or
from any use by him of its property.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-540(1) (Law.Coop. 1990).
20. Wilson, - S.C. at __, 473 S.E.2d at 856.
21. See Sturkie v. Sifly, 280 S.C. 453, 457, 313 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ct. App.1984).
22. Wilson, _ S.C. _, 473 S.E.2d at 858-860.
23. Parker Peanut Co. v. Felder, 200 S.C. 203, 20 S.E.2d 716 (1942) best exemplifies a
failure to adhere to corporate formalities. In that case, the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld
a disregard of the corporate entity because the defendant corporation failed to hold any
stockholder's or director's meetings, failed to issue any stock certificates, failed to keep records
of stock transactions or minutes, and indeed, kept no records of any of its transactions for a full
16 years after the corporate charter was issued. Id. at 217, 20 S.E.2d at 721-22.
19971
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charged that Friedberg commingled partnership funds with funds from other
ventures,' they did not accuse Friedberg of actually siphoning funds for his
own benefit-the distinction is quite significant. Furthermore, although the
plaintiffs alleged that the general partner failed to provide income and expense
records, they provided no indication as to the absence of other records
distinctly corporate in nature, such as minutes of meetings, stock certificates
or board resolutions. Again, the plaintiffs stress the impact of the record as
a whole. The plaintiffs argue that there was a general non-functioning of other
directors; however, the record indicates that Mary Feldman served as
President of Royal Promotions and that she played a role in finalizing
subscription agreements for the events and in reviewing the profits and losses
with the limited partners.' The plaintiffs appear to have made a mere bald
assertion that the corporation was a facade for Friedberg's operations. It
seems that plaintiffs' arguments are the more facile. Indeed, mechanically
pointing to the record as a whole should not be adequate to prove the first
prong of the piercing test..
C. Viability of DeWitt's Eight Factors: Strict List or Guidepost?
The Wilson opinion raises the question of whether the eight-factor analysis
adopted in Sturkie is a checklist to be strictly applied or merely a list of
considerations to guide a court as it assesses the relationship of the corporate
shareholder to corporation. Though the primary dispute in Sturkie focused on
fundamental unfairness, the court alluded to the first prong of the test as being
a rather strict eight-factor analysis rather than an examination of the totality
of the circumstances. 26 Veil-piercing cases after Sturkie, that focused more
intently on the first prong of the test, have concentrated on specific instances
of accord with the eight factors set forth in DeWitt.27 The court's failure in
Wilson to specify any evidence in alignment with the eight DeWitt factors
suggests a lessening of the plaintiff's evidentiary burden and a shift toward a
totality of the circumstances approach.
24. See Record at 44. The attorney for the plaintiffs makes allegations of deficiencies in
accounting, but he never alleges that Friedberg actually siphoned funds for his own benefit.
25. See Record at 217-19.
26. Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 458, 313 S.E.2d at 318 (Ct. App. 1984) (referring to proof of a
"sufficient number of the eight factors to justify piercing the corporate veil.").
27. Only two South Carolina cases have actually analyzed the first prong of the test since
DeWitt. In Cumberland Wood Products v. Bennett, the Court of Appeals articulated the evidence
as it applies to the eight factor analysis, emphasizing that the disregard of the corporate entity
must be supported by a significant number of the factors. 308 S.C. 268,270-71,417 S.E.2d 617,
618-19 (Ct. App. 1992). In Dumas v. Infosafe Corp., the Court of Appeals also articulated the
evidence according to the eight factors, rather than viewing the record as a whole. 320 S.C. 188,
192, 463 S.E.2d 641, 644 (Ct. App. 1995).
[Vol. 48:905
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D. Equating Fiduciary Status with a Duty of Fundamental Fairness
The court in Wilson also affirmed the trial court's finding that Friedberg's
breach of fiduciary duty was tantamount to meeting the fundamental unfairness
requirement announced as Sturkie's second prong.' The essence of the
fairness inquiry is to ensure that an individual is not allowed "to hide from the
normal consequences of carefree entrepreneuring by doing so through a
corporate shell."29 As mentioned previously, however, a plaintiff must prove
fundamental unfairness by showing the defendant's awareness of plaintiff's
claims and defendant's subsequent choice to disregard those claims in service
of personal interests."0 It is at least odd that the Wilson court did not
explicitly address the knowledge and self-serving activity requirements set
forth in Sturkie.
3
1
The basis of the action was that Royal Promotions failed to respond to
repeated requests for income and expense records. 32 Without question, the
limited partners had a statutory right to request an accounting for the
partnership's actions.33 Moreover, Friedberg, being the party responsible for
preparing all income and expense records and the party who handled the
general accounting of the partnership, seems the obvious and proper recipient
28. Wilson, _ S.C. , 473 S.E.2d at 856-57.
29. Dumas, 320 S.C. at 192-93,463 S.E.2d at 644 (citing Multimedia Publ'g v. Mullins, 314
S.C. 551, 556, 431 S.E.2d 569, 573 (1993)).
30. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
31. 280 S.C. at 459, 313 S.E.2d at 319.
32. Wilson, __S.C. at_,473 S.E.2d at 855. For litigation purposes, the court of appeals
has held that an unwillingness or an inability to provide documentation of the corporation's status
or its compliance with the eight-factor analysis creates a strong inference that the corporation does
not observe formalities. See Ball, 314 S.C. at 277, 442 S.E.2d at 623. In Ball, the plaintiffs
were independent truckers that had contracted with the defendant truck brokerage business for
transport of shipments to various destinations. After discovering documentation that led them to
suspect that they were being underpaid, the plaintiffs brought an action to collect on the shipments
for which they had been underpaid. At the trial level, the referee held Canadian American
Express (Can-Am) personally liable for the debt. The Court of Appeals affirmed the imposition
of personal liability because Can-Am failed to produce corporate records, despite repeated
discovery requests. Though the court did not declare a presumption in favor of the plaintiffs
where the defendants fail to produce such records, it stated that such absence of record creates
a strong inference of failure to adhere to corporate formalities. Id. at 274-77, 442 S.E.2d at 622-
23.
33. The statute codifying this right provides as follows:
Any partner shall have the right to a formal account as to partnership affairs:
(1) If he is wrongfully excluded from the partnership business or possession of
its property by his copartners;
(2) If the right exists under the terms of any agreement;
(3) As provided by § 33-41-540; or
(4) Whenever other circumstances render it just and reasonable.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-550 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
1997]
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of such a request." From the record it is clear (perhaps explaining the
court's glossing over the issue) that Friedberg was aware of the limited
partners desire for an accounting. 5
Yet, there remains no clear explanation as to why the court skipped past
a self-serving activity analysis. The South Carolina Supreme Court has stated
that "where a partner charged with the duty to keep a record of partnership
transactions fails to do so and is unable to account for them, every presump-
tion will be made against him."36 The Wilson case represents the first
opportunity the Court has had to consider a suit by a limited partner that
argues for piercing the veil of a corporate general partner. 37 Though non-
disclosure of records may not appear sufficiently egregious to warrant a
finding of fundamental unfairness (especially the self-serving element) the
court may have applied a more stringent standard because it perceived a larger
duty is owed between partners in a partnership.
38
34. See Record at 287. Friedberg, however, maintained throughout the action that he did not
intend to take on any personally liability by his actions. See Record at 285 and 344. This
contention is in direct contrast to the facts of DeWitt, in which the appellant-defendant, upon
being reminded by the plaintiff of his debt, pledged to personally pay the charges if the
corporation failed to do so. DeNVitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d
681, 689 (4th Cir. 1976).
35. See Record at 344.
36. Lawson v. Rogers, 312 S.C. 492, 499, 435 S.E.2d 853, 857 (1993).
37. There does not appear to be another South Carolina case where a limited partner has
brought a veil-piercing action against a general partner, but there have been such cases in other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Baird Ward Printing Co. v. Great Recipes Publ'g Ass'n, 811 F.2d 305
(6th Cir. 1987) (refusing to find individual shareholder personally liable where he notified
creditor that he was substituting his newly formed corporation as the general partner in a limited
partnership so as to limit his personal liability); In re County Green Ltd. Partnership, 604 F.2d
289 (4th Cir. 1979) (refusing to allow mechanics lien holders to pierce the corporate veil of
bankrupt general partner where the decision of the bankruptcy court was found to be reasonable
and supported by the record); Pearl v. Shore, 95 Cal. Rptr. 157 (Ct. App. 1971) (finding limited
partner not entitled to recover from corporate general partner where there was no showing of bad
faith on the part of the corporate shareholder, where the corporate difficulties were found to be
the result of mismanagement rather than undercapitalization, and where shareholder had nothing
to do with the day to day operation of the corporate general partner); Delaney v. Fidelity Lease
Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543 (rex. 1975) (holding limited partner that takes part in the control or
management of a general partner cannot evade liability where the corporate general partner's
identity is disregarded); Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc., 562 P.2d 244 (Wash.
1977) (en bane) (ruling that because the parties agreed that the limited partners refrained from
acting in any personal capacity, and because their personal affairs were kept separate from the
corporation's, the corporate identity should be respected).
38. Several South Carolina cases address the relationship between partners. See Lawson v.
Rogers, 312 S.C. 492, 499, 435 S.E.2d 853, 857 (1993) ("The relationship of a partnership is
fiduciary in character and imposes on the members the obligation of refraining from taking any
advantage of one another by the slightest misrepresentation or concealment."); Few v. Few, 239
S.C. 321, 336, 122 S.E.2d 829, 836 (1961) (stating that partners have a fiduciary relationship
characterized by mutual trust and confidence, requiring loyalty, good faith and fair dealing);
[Vol. 48:905
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Wilson also represents the most recent in a line of cases featuring an
individual as the target shareholder-defendant. Since Sturkie, the vast majority
of cases have been aimed at an individual, dominant shareholder.39 This is
unusual and may serve to skew South Carolina jurisprudence in this area.
When a parent corporation is the defendant in a piercing case, the impersonal
corporate entity stands to be held liable, and the corporation's wealth is at
risk. In contrast, when the defendant-shareholder is an individual, the
potential for ruinous personal liability, extending well beyond business assets,
is at stake. Courts might understandably be more willing to disregard the
corporate entity where a corporation is the defendant rather than an individu-
al.' Wilson, for better or worse, strays from this impassioned conclusion.
IV. CONCLUSION
The ruling of the court of appeals in Wilson represents a disregard of
legal, statutorily granted rights.4 A court should only disregard these rights
when its ruling is justifiable on a strong, equitable basis.42 It is this aspect
of Wilson that makes the lack of specific evidence somewhat disturbing.
Leading authorities make it clear that one can incorporate for the very purpose
of limiting personal liability.43 Disregarding this protection should be based
Anthony v. Padmar, Inc., 320 S.C. 436, 450,465 S.E.2d 745, 753 (Ct. App. 1995) ("By virtue
of the general partners' position, the limited partner must rely upon the general partners'
scrupulous performance of their duty to inform and represent the limited partners to the best of
their abilities.").
39. See Multimedia Publ'g, 314 S.C. at 551, 431 S.E.2d at 569 (detailing a newspaper's
action for breach of contract brought against an individual director and majority shareholder of
incorporatedgrocery store); Cumberland Wood Prods. v. Bennett, 308 S.C. 268, 417 S.E.2d 617
(Ct. App. 1992) (resolving a wood supplier's suit against an individual, majority shareholder for
breach of contract); Sturkie v. Sifly, 280 S.C. 453, 313 S.E.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1984) (action
against two sole shareholders).
Of the post-Sturkie cases listing a corporation as the defendant, all except one have sought
to impose personal liability on one or two individuals. See Dumas v. Infosafe Corp., 320 S.C.
188, 463 S.E.2d 641 (Ct. App. 1995) (seeking to impose personal liability on corporation's
president and sole shareholder); Ball v. Canadian Am. Express Co., 314 S.C. 272, 442 S.E.2d
620 (Ct. App. 1994) (seeking to impose personal liability on the two individuals serving as sole
owners and operators of the corporation).
Only one modem South Carolina case deviates from this trend. Peoples Federal Savings
& Loan Ass'n v. Myrtle Beach Golf & Yacht Club, 310 S.C. 132, 425 S.E.2d 764 (Ct. App.
1992) involved a counterclaim where a junior mortgagee sought to pierce the corporate veil of
a wholly owned subsidiary to hold liable its sole shareholder, a savings and loan company.
40. See Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEx. L. REV. 979, 992 (1971).
41. See supra note 1.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4; see also Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 457, 313 S.E.2d
at 318.
43. Matter of Kaiser, 791 F.2d 73, 75 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) ("The principle of limited
1997]
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on well-articulated evidence that justifies stripping the shareholder of his
rights-the sort of well articulated evidence that was conspicuously absent in
Wilson.
Brian A. Comer
liability, whereby a corporation's creditors cannot reach the personal assets of the shareholder
... is important to our capitalist system. It enables people to invest in business without
hazarding their entire wealth on the venture."); Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., Inc. 127 N.E.2d
832, 833 (N.Y. 1955) (Froessel, J.) ("The law permits the incorporation of a business for the
very purpose of escaping personal liability.").
[Vol. 48:905
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